



Abstract Chapter 5 applies the knowledge discussed in Chapter 4 to two
illustrative case studies. Many interventions tend to represent a simple
‘trial and error’ approach underpinned by intensive grounded research to
facilitate our understanding of change processes or change resistance.
Tracking the identiﬁcation of a ‘need’ and our experience of designing
and monitoring the evaluation of that process, in the light of the new
knowledge gained through ongoing research review, improves our under-
standing of the complexity of social processes. Chapter 5 redeﬁnes the
objectives of our action-research project from setting out to capture the
ingredients of positive change to pro-actively understanding and learning
from failure. It attempts, in the context of this potentially debilitating
reality, to take stock and identify the characteristics of least-harm inter-
ventions to chart the next stage of our journey.
It concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at policy makers
and volunteer deployment agencies.
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Chapter 5 takes stock of the material presented in the previous chapters
and the cumulative knowledge gained from 8 years’ experience of inten-
sive action-oriented evaluation research. Our learning and ‘knowing’ as
activists and researchers has been a continuous process: there was no point
at which we went into the ﬁeld knowledge or value-free and we have and
will never reach the point of knowledge saturation (ultimate truth).
Research of this nature is a journey. Perhaps the greatest single quality
of any researcher (or volunteer) embarking on this type of journey is the
honesty and humility to accept that we are always learning and also that, in
many respects, we are not simply (or usually) measuring positive outcomes
but trying to understand intervention failure and inertia. This may not be
the message individual researchers, volunteers or their funding bodies
want to hear. However, observing and understanding policy failure does
not imply failure on the part of the actors/projects concerned. Far from it.
Indeed, a growing body of research documents the speciﬁc quality of
higher-level entrepreneurial learning that arises from ‘hard knocks’ or
‘discontinuous events’ (Cope 2003, 2011). In a rather different context,
Mayer suggests that errors present the learner with robust feedback that
can act as scaffolding for future learning (2008) and Somekh identiﬁes
‘episodes of substantial friction’ or ‘knots’ as starting points for deeper
collaboration (2006: 23).
On a broader and more ethical note, interventions and associated
research are not there to beneﬁt individual actors, be they researchers,
volunteers, projects, funding bodies or ‘the industry’ (Valters 2015), but
rather to ‘maximise the likelihood that knowledge generated will be
ultimately of beneﬁt to humanity’ (Richards 2015: 3).
The Sustainable Volunteering Project (in common with other similar
projects and probably most Health Partnership interventions) has very
broad and ambitious objectives focused on systemic improvements in
maternal and newborn health through professional voluntarism. This
type of project is perhaps best characterised as an example of a ‘complex
intervention’. If we accept the UK Medical Research Council’s deﬁnition
of complex interventions as those involving ‘several interacting compo-
nents’ (MRC 2008: 6) then, as Richards argue, ‘simplicity is probably a
chimera1’ and most interventions should be considered as ‘complex’
(2015: 2). Richards clariﬁes this deﬁnition suggesting that complexity is
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not so much about the intervention itself but the questions we are posing.
Where context is seen to be of great importance and where we are inter-
ested not so much in ‘does’ an intervention work but ‘how’ or ‘why’ it
works (or perhaps how/why it does not work) then it must qualify as
complex.
Furthermore, Hallberg argues that complexity is relevant when we are
addressing interventions with several or multiple individual components and
when considering how these interact with one another (2015: 17).
According to these criteria, it is clear that the SVP qualiﬁes as a ‘complex
intervention’. And that intervention comprises numerous constituent inter-
ventions that have emerged in a very iterative and reﬂexive way throughout
the duration of the wider programme. The unplanned nature of these may
indicate a lack of planning or element of what the MRC refers to somewhat
dismissively as ‘pragmatism’ (2008: 9). We would rather contend that this
represents a necessary commitment to democratic engagement and subsi-
diarity supporting grounded policy engagement and development. And, a
degree of ‘planned happenchance’ (Malecki 2013: 87) or serendipity
(Ackers and Gill 2008: 59) has been identiﬁed as a key component of social
networking, creativity and entrepreneurialism.
The chapter opens with the presentation of two case studies illustrating
the kinds of learning arising from the progressive failure of speciﬁc constitu-
ent interventions. The two cases are chosen as they represent generic/
foundational ‘back-to-basics’ initiatives that lie at the heart of many, if not
most, Health Partnership interventions in low-resource settings. For the
purposes of this chapter we have adopted the approach advocated by the
MRC for the evaluation of complex interventions. This involves identifying
‘a theoretical understanding of the likely process of change’2 (2008: 9);
identifying outcomes and then, in a break from traditional experimental
methods, assessing causal mechanisms and contextual factors.
CASE STUDY 1: ‘WAITING KILLS’: CONGESTION, DISORDER
AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT
The need for improved patient management is immediately evident on
arrival in any large public health facility in Uganda. Stark visible evidence
of over-crowding with patients and attendants on ﬂoors and spilling
over into corridors and outdoor areas confronts and shocks every recently
arrived professional volunteer. Similarly, every Ugandan health professional
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visiting a UK facility is immediately struck by the image of orderliness and
effective patient management. Triage3 is a foundational component of basic
patient safety and underpins all subsequent clinical interventions (in that
facility). It is perhaps no surprise that so many volunteers and HPs visiting
Uganda have identiﬁed triage as a priority and sought to intervene.
Initial ‘Theory of Change’: The Development of a More Structured System
to Prioritise Patients According to Clinical Need Will Improve Clinical
Interventions and Patient Outcomes.
Case study 1 reports on a series of constituent interventions that together
comprise a more composite and complex intervention. We have reported
it here in a way that infers linearity. To some extent, the intervention did
emerge over time in one facility becoming more complex and multi-
faceted as the interventions progressively failed to impact and our knowl-
edge of the context and failure dynamics deepened. However, similar
interventions (with slight differences in approach reﬂecting the particular
qualities of individual partnerships and institutional settings) all met with
similar resistance and none has delivered sustained impact. In that respect,
we are combining (rather loosely) a longitudinal and comparative case
study approach.
In the ﬁrst instance, and perhaps reﬂecting presumptions about roles and
a profound belief in the value/logic of training (as noted in Chapter 3), a
common starting point is typically the co-production/adaptation of proto-
cols and associated short-course training.
Intervention: Skills Deﬁcits
The identiﬁcation of the ‘problem’ during the early phases of LMP
intervention was that the failure to triage patients effectively is imme-
diately and directly linked to skills deﬁcits among Ugandan public
health workers. In the language of behavioural science theories, we
were focusing attention here on individual (clinical) capabilities. The
operational Theory of Change at this point can be described as follows:
Engagement of UK professional volunteers alongside Ugandan coun-
terparts in the co-production of appropriate protocols and associated
(CME) training and local awareness-raising will encourage effective
patient triage.
At this stage, the intervention could be described as alarmingly simple
involving the transmission of explicit clinical skills (how to do, record and
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interpret basic patient observations) in order to prioritise care. So simple,
in fact, that our early interventions now look incredibly naive and must
have been the source of much amusement on the part of local Ugandan
managers.
Evaluation of this intervention is often achieved through straightfor-
ward ‘measuring’ tools recording the volume of staff trained, testing skills
acquisition before-and-after CMEs and assessing subsequent implementa-
tion through (numerical) evidence of completion of observations in
patient notes. We combined these (obligatory methods) with ongoing
ethnographic ﬁeldwork involving the project evaluator, the professional
volunteers (as action-researchers), a dedicated social science volunteer and
local collaborators.
Outcomes
Unfortunately, the outcomes associated with this form of intervention
have been consistently disappointing. While it is common to recruit
large numbers for CME training and to report strong evidence of initial
skills acquisition among the cohort trained it is rare to see any evidence of
sustained behaviour change. Limited short-term compliance is typically
witnessed in deﬁned areas (spaces/units) where volunteers involved in the
intervention remain co-present for a period of time. Training in triage
showed greater initial success in the 6-bed obstetric High Dependency
Unit set up through LMP with funding support from THET. In many of
the typical ﬂy-in-ﬂy-out CMEs where volunteer ‘faculty’ unfamiliar with
the context leave immediately upon completion of training, implementa-
tion failure is unlikely to be recognised. Ongoing ethnographic observa-
tion combined with qualitative interviews and continual review of patient
notes provided immediate evidence of impact failure and an emerging
understanding of implementation gaps.
Identifying and Responding to Failure
In the initial stages of our intervention we were advised by local health
workers that they were unable to use their new skills because they lacked
resources, including stationary (for recording purposes) and basic equipment
to take observations (stethoscopes and blood pressure machines, etc.).
A review of parallel interventions in other settings (through literature and
policy review work) identiﬁed similar outcomes and drew our attention to
work on ‘neglected processes’. At this point we held a workshop4 in the UK
inviting stakeholders from the UK and Ugandan arms of health partnerships
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(plus a representative from the Ugandan Ministry of Health) to share
experiences. The workshop achieved some consensus on problem deﬁnition
and an ostensible commitment on the part of the MOH to prioritise,
integrate and roll-out protocols (such as the African Maternal Early
Warning Scoring System5 or AMEWS). This failed to happen.
On the basis of expert advice, this led to a reﬁned intervention involving
the production of a personalised observation kit to be provided to every
health worker in target locations with the aim of achieving a degree of
saturation that would empower and motivate individuals to utilise their
triage skills.
Intervention: Physical Resource Deﬁcits
The revised Theory of Change was focused on the opportunities that
individuals (who have received the above training) have to utilise skills:
providing personal observation kits would, we hoped, enable indivi-
duals to take observations in a timely fashion and empower/motivate
them to do so. And, ensuring continuous supplies of stationary (by
external organisations) will facilitate compliance. In the language of
behavioural science theories, we were focusing attention here on indi-
vidual (clinical) opportunities. Further complementary audit tools
were co-developed (and discussed with health workers) to capture
use of the kits and reduce the risks of theft/misuse.
Outcomes
The intervention was a stark failure: outcomes associated with it were very
limitedwith patchy and short-lived compliance. The co-presence of volunteers
enhances compliance for the duration of their stay with almost immediate
slippage once the volunteer leaves. Stationary remained a problem, especially
in high-volume settings. The provision of personalised equipment failed to
empower/motivate health workers and/or promote skills implementation.
Personalised kits proved unsustainable even with audit systems in place.
Identifying and Responding to Failure?
The approach proved to lack sustainability as the facility resisted demands
to integrate the provision of stationary within the mainstream hospital
system. Kits (as valuable commodities) were (very) favourably received and
immediately utilised in zones where volunteers were actively present.
However, equipment was ‘lost’ and the practice of using equipment
suffered (very) rapid decline.6
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Intervention: Physical Resource Deﬁcits (revised)
A follow-up intervention negotiated with volunteers and senior line man-
agers (who had it has to be said actively resisted the idea of providing
personalised kits) involved ‘permanently’ afﬁxing robust equipment and
clocks to the walls of a dedicated triage area aimed to overcome the risks of
theft and exploit the apparent beneﬁts of establishing discrete and man-
ageable ‘zones’. This was supported by the institution of a simple and clear
‘trafﬁc light’ system using colour-coded boxes afﬁxed to the walls to
prioritise patients: cases regarded as urgent were given a simple laminated
red card. A US NGO later provided a high-tech electronic notice board to
improve patient waiting, which soon after became dysfunctional.
Outcomes
Outcomes were initially strong with some excitement and pride in the
new facility and equipment. However, compliance was short-lived. The
co-presence of volunteers enhanced compliance for the duration of their
stay only. Equipment became damaged and stolen almost immediately.
The use of trafﬁc light boxes became redundant as soon as the volunteer
left; laminated red cards used to signify emergency cases mysteriously
vanished. The continued (high volume) of staff rotations in this highly
congested area made it harder to build cultural change and ensure a
saturation level of training in the use of protocols.
Identifying and Responding to Failure
There was apparent confusion over the loss of equipment from the walls
and disappearance of the laminated red cards (which have no monetary
value). Conﬁdential qualitative interviews with mid and senior facility
managers (conducted off-site) revealed the presence of endemic and
highly organised corruption ‘syndicates’. They explained that triage (as
prioritisation according to clinical need) lies in profound tension with
organised and systemic corruption that is effectively smoke-screened
through the appearance of chaos. The ‘inert’ knowledge deﬁcit model
fails to take account of in-depth local tacit knowledge (entrepreneurial
destructive/confounding knowledge) impeding implementation. We
learnt that chaos is planned and highly functional. It is also systemic:
attempts to improve individual behaviour through investments in training
(individual capabilities) and personalised equipment (opportunities) stood
little chance of altering a system functioning effectively for many health
workers and managers on the basis of corruption.
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There is insufﬁcient scope here to discuss corruption in more detail (see
Ackers 2014). It is important to note however that corruption not only
impacts local health workers and their ability to imagine new realities but
also has a major impact on volunteer deployment and impact. The follow-
ing example provided by a Ugandan health worker who had worked
alongside SVP volunteers is illustrative:
There is a problem with Ugandan midwives (working with volunteers). I’ve
seen it. They think, ‘oh she is white she will know what to do – she can do it
by herself’. There is a problem of attitude amongst us – bad attitudes which
give off a bad signal. I was in [a health facility] doing a delivery with a white
volunteer and there was a retained placenta and oh my goodness the local
midwife made a noise in her own language. She wanted money from the
patient. She didn’t want the white lady there so I said, ‘you know what, let’s
go to another patient.’
[Would the midwife try to get money from a patient even at the point at
which she had a retained placenta?]
Yes, of course. They are opportunists. They will look and think, ‘behind
that curtain that patient has nice bedsheets’ so she won’t want the volunteer
there (UHW).
The very stark conclusion we have come to is that triage will fundamentally
fail to work effectively in most (larger and congested) Ugandan public
facilities where accountability is absent and efforts by volunteers to sup-
port it will be met by marked resistance: triage as a method of sorting
patients according to clinical need lies in immediate tension with the
sorting of patients according to their ability to pay.
Adherence to basic protocols (and in particular the AMEWS) was
initially stronger in the dedicated ‘High Dependency Unit’ set up by the
LMP charity with support from THET. This unit had only six beds and
(necessarily) higher stafﬁng levels. Equipment in such a conﬁned space was
less likely to be lost/stolen as greater accountability was in place. It was
also easier to ensure a constant supply of stationary (via project funding).
However, even in this more controlled setting, whilst the act of taking and
documenting observations was more common, the logic of this process is
that once certain critical points in the protocol are reached a doctor must
be called. Midwifery staff were failing to ‘escalate’ care and call doctors
when critical observations were recorded. Ethnographic work in situ
combined with conﬁdential qualitative interviews revealed unwillingness
and, in some cases, fear of following this through. In practice, the staff
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either could not/would not use their own mobile phones for this process
(at their own cost7) or had grown tired of repeated fruitless attempts to
contact on-call doctors. In (many) other cases, midwives had experienced
heavy criticism/chastisement from doctors for disturbing them. This is an
endemic problem in Ugandan public health facilities.
Our analysis of failure at this stage illustrates the importance of combin-
ing explicit clinical skills with tacit knowledge and an emerging under-
standing of the impact of hierarchy and power (positionality) on
relationships and implementation. We are no longer dealing with indivi-
duals but with complex organisations and ‘systems within systems’
founded on subversive knowledge rather than a lack of knowledge per se.
Intervention: Human Resource System Deﬁcits
Continued CME training provided by volunteers and local staff was
introduced to manage (clinical) skills gaps caused by staff rotations (this
is really a restatement of the initial Theory of Change but emphasising the
importance of continuity and repeat training). Further engagement with
senior managers was pursued to improve accountability, build relation-
ships between staff cadres improving the empowerment of midwives and
responsiveness of doctors. The behavioural science model may characterise
this as an individual motivation ‘deﬁcit.’ At this stage in the process we
tried to combine our earlier interventions targeted at individuals with a
ﬁrmer focus on advocacy and policy implementation processes. This
included more active engagement with high-level stakeholders and man-
agers to remove barriers to the escalation process, reduce the potential for
corruption to inﬂuence patient prioritisation and ensure that doctors are
accountable and accessible.
Outcome: This proved to be a total failure: improving the presence and
responsiveness of doctors has proven to be fundamentally resistant to
change in spite of managerial interventions. Corruption continues to
disrupt processes and resist change. Even the highest-level managers
openly admitted that they lacked the power to challenge organised syndi-
cates, the behaviour of senior doctors and corruption dynamics.
Review and Theory Development: At this point the search for relevant
research and explanatory theories fans out beyond the initial ‘simple’ inter-
vention spanning multiple disciplines to generate new and highly complex
knowledge combinations; clinical knowledge declines in signiﬁcance as
theories of corruption, human resource management and knowledge trans-
fer take on a new signiﬁcance. The relevance and value of systematic review
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declines as the search for more composite and complex theories capable of
understanding wider systemic and structural dynamics becomes essential to
future interventions. Fundamentally, acknowledgement of the complexities
of researcher/volunteer positionality and the very limited scope for for-
eigner engagement in anti-corruption interventions highlights the resilience
(functionality) of existing systems and the limited scope for impact from
external professional volunteering and Health Partnership intervention.
This case study has shown how the implementation of something as
apparently simple as triage with the potential to signiﬁcantly reduce mater-
nal and neonatal mortality (and the need for emergency intervention) whilst
also substantially reducing the costs of public services has proved impossible
to implement.
Grounded local knowledge achieved through ongoing ethnographic
methods has enabled us to begin to understand the importance of tacit
knowledge and the barriers to change. Interventions focused on individual
capabilities or opportunities and individual behaviour change will not
achieve systems change in public health facilities in Uganda. The powerful
impact of subversive (tacit) knowledge and vested interests render the
current system fully functional for the status quo. In this environment,
those health workers and managers (and there are many) who genuinely
hope and strive for systems change inevitably ﬁnd it impossible to imagine
a new reality and engage in action-planning to achieve that. And, sadly,
the system will close ranks on those individuals who risk putting their
heads above the parapet. Table 5.1 summarises the processes outlined
before and the emphasis on deﬁcits at each stage.
CASE STUDY 2: MANAGING OBSTETRIC EMERGENCIES
The majority of UK/Ugandan Health Partnerships focus on hospital–
hospital relationships.8 And most are headed up by senior clinicians,
mainly doctors (Ackers and Porter 2011). Volunteer clinical trainees are
also usually keen to be placed in large, congested, hospitals where high
patient volumes and clinical complexity meet both altruistic and clinical
exposure needs (Tate 2016).9 This, coupled with the policy emphasis and
associated metrics (embedded in the Millennium Development Goals) on
maternal mortality, encourages an emphasis on those facilities where the
majority of recorded deaths take place.
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The SVP benchmarking process collated facility-held data on maternal
mortality. Table 5.2 lists the main ‘causes’ of maternal deaths in Mulago
National Referral Hospital in the 12 months from January 2012 to
December 2012:
The data presented here should not be regarded as ‘facts.’ Certainly
each maternal death recorded here is a sad fact but the process of establish-
ing (single factor) causation is highly problematic. Signiﬁcant pressure
fuelled by SVP volunteers has encouraged a process of maternal mortality
review, but compliance across the HUB remains patchy. As such, all
facility-generated data must be regarded as a social construction.10
Nevertheless, it serves one of the most important functions of quantitative
data: it indicates trends and raises critical questions. During the early
months of the LMP project (and very much playing the role of handmai-
den to the obstetrician lead) we took it at face value that these were the
causes of maternal deaths rather than the ﬁnal ‘hit’ on the protracted ‘road
to death’ (Filippi et al. 2005).
Faced with the alarming volume of maternal and neonatal deaths
occurring in these referral facilities and the earlier ‘evidence’ on causation,
it may come as no surprise that the overwhelming initial response was to
advocate the introduction of (imported/amended) protocols and
Table 5.2 Causes and frequencies of maternal deaths in Mulago (Jan-12
to Dec-12)
Causes of death Number of instances in 2012
Abortion 26
Eclampsia 22





Cardiac arrest on table 2
Puerperal sepsis 33
Malaria in pregnancy 8
Tetanus 0
Ruptured ectopic 4
Dead on arrival 1
Total 157
Source: McKay and Ackers 2013.
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associated CME-style short-course training packaged under the generic
title of ‘Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care (EmONC)’. This was
certainly our experience during our early involvement with the Liverpool-
Mulago Partnership and, subsequently, in the Ugandan Maternal and
Newborn Hub. And, in the ﬁrst instance, as non-clinicians, we lacked
the experiential knowledge and conﬁdence to challenge the dominant
medical paradigm. Indeed, in our report on Emergency Obstetric Skills
Training conducted by SVP volunteers, we describe the intervention as an
‘intensive two-day course designed to address the main causes of maternal
mortality in resource poor settings in a systematic fashion’ (Tate 2014).
Several years and experience later we would question this ‘diagnosis’.
The identiﬁcation of the ‘problem’ at this stage in our learning was
twofold: ﬁrst, that many women are dying from (emergency) conditions
that are preventable if staff had the right skills (to treat emergences). And,
second, that Uganda lacks human resource capacity (clinicians do not pos-
sess the appropriate level of skill). Once again, this is immediately (evidently)
apparent on the wards which are manned mainly by intern (junior) doctors.
Initial Theory of Change: The engagement of UK clinical volunteers
alongside Ugandan counterparts in the adaptation of established ‘Green
Top Guidelines’11 from the UK and associated (CME) training will reduce
maternal and neonatal mortality.
Intervention: Skills Deﬁcits (Capabilities)
The intervention could be described as relatively simple12 involving the
transmission of explicit clinical skills. These included training in the value
of observations and early warning scores (Case Study 1) and management of
conditions such as eclampsia, haemorrhage and sepsis. As in Case Study 1,
following the requirements of our funding body (THET), the immediate
evaluation involved counting the volume of participants and simple before-
and-after testing of skills acquisition (during the 2-day period). Combined
with feedback forms, these instruments indicated a very marked improve-
ment in skills and a strong expressed intentionality on the part of partici-
pants to utilise them.
In many interventions, this is where evaluation ends and training teams
then ‘ﬂy-home.’ Whilst pre- and post-testing measures typically indicate a
high level of immediate impact, attempting to assess/project any causal
(attributable) impact on mortality rates, etc., is ambitious and highly
unlikely to succeed. Ethnographic observational methods combined with
5 ITERATIVE LEARNING: ‘KNOWLEDGE FOR CHANGE’? 125
interviews indicated the application of some of the skills acquired amongst
some of the trainees for a limited period of time and when in co-present
relationships with volunteers. In practice, the ripples of good practice
extending from these forms of training soon disappear.
Outcomes
Sadly, our research indicates that, although skills such as these can never
be entirely wasted in terms of individual learning and potential; the
investment in short CME-style interventions does not deliver the kinds
of behaviour change capable of impacting public health systems in an
effective, sustainable and efﬁcient manner. Staff rotations make it espe-
cially difﬁcult to monitor the skills use of those individuals whose skills
gain is highest (junior doctors, interns and students). Whilst methods
could have been developed to track individual journeys and attempt to
assess skills use, the focus of the project on highly contextualised speciﬁc
public facilities within the HUB discouraged this approach. Whilst we
could have expended research resource to track individuals, we also felt
quite strongly that implementation depends on achieving a level of critical
mass capable of inﬂuencing cultural change within organisations sup-
ported by managerial buy-in.
Furthermore, many more established staff – and especially doctors – are
not present on public wards with any degree of regularity to enable skills
utilisation to take place (or be observed). And, many clinicians who are
motivated to engage in training do so to facilitate career moves out of
clinical work altogether, into the private sector (internal brain drain) or to
clinical work in other countries (external brain drain). This proved to be
the case with many of the clinicians who came to the UK supported by
British Commonwealth Fellowships. Whilst the SVP objectives in bringing
people to the UK were initially to enhance capabilities through training,
the majority of fellows have used the credentials gained and networks
established to exit clinical work in Uganda. In many cases they gained a
new appetite for and conﬁdence in international travel, immediately mov-
ing onto other courses in Sweden, Australia and Kenya (among others).
Others have established their own NGOs or private training enterprises
and become trainers themselves in Uganda, positioning themselves to
harvest international NGO funding for CMEs. Others have sought direct
employment in the private or NGO sector. Certainly the individual moti-
vation in many cases is to use this experience to exit or reduce reliance on
public sector clinical work.
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When we assess data on human resources in Ugandan facilities, it is
immediately apparent that the staff who are visibly present to profes-
sional volunteers (and form the basis of the presumption of a major
skills shortage) represent the most junior of cadres (intern doctors and
students). Large volumes of more experienced and highly trained
staff, many of whom have had remarkable opportunities for interna-
tional training, are simply not present on the wards to implement
skills.
Training Protocols in CMEs
In the course of the SVP project, we were made aware of serious problems
arising from varieties of foreign organisations coming into Uganda and
training to their own national protocols/guidelines. This was resisted by
local stakeholders who felt that they had perfectly sound guidelines
endorsed by their own professional organisations and that using different
systems confused staff and undermined efﬁcacy. Attempts by the SVP to
encourage multi-disciplinary and international collaboration, although
welcomed, failed to encourage the necessary cooperation required (even
within the UK).
The problems associated with selecting appropriate guidelines and
protocols extend beyond this concern with imposing imported national
systems. One might argue (as we did at one point) that internationally
agreed protocols would overcome this tension. Our experience of working
with WHO guidelines in our current Hand Hygiene Project13 identiﬁes
further sources of complexity. In this case, Ugandan infection control
specialists accustomed to training according to WHO ‘African Partners
for Patient Safety’ (APPS) protocols14 are also experiencing major imple-
mentation gaps. The problem arises when training ignores local contexts
and assumes the existence of critical ‘opportunities’. In our recent work,
this included an assumption manifest in MOH guidelines (Fig. 5.1) that
all facilities have running water, hand soap and single-use hand towels (or
paper towels):
Such a situation would be unique in Ugandan public health facilities.
Indeed, when we sent our project manager to visit the trainer’s own
facility, she advised us that recently they had no water due to the fact
that bills had not been paid. On this occasion the staff and patients
launched a protest, which forced authorities to restore water to the facility.
On the basis of this lesson we then proposed that our own training in Fort
Portal would be targeted very speciﬁcally to local conditions and embrace
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Fig. 5.1 Ministry of Health guidance on Hand Hygiene (2014) (Source:
Ugandan national infection prevention and control guidelines (MOH 2013))
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an element of empowerment of local health workers and patients. Training
Ugandan health workers using the APPS tools without careful attention to
local conditions achieves nothing in practice and may even contribute to
low morale.
This emphasises the importance of the ‘opportunity’ dimension of beha-
viour change. Certainly in the case of hand hygiene, we would argue that
most health workers understand the need to wash their hands both for their
own protection and that of their patients. But faced with the lack of running
water, soap and single-use towels, they ﬁnd it impossible to see the beneﬁts
of training and imagine the reality of improved patient safety.
The SVP Benchmarking data underlined the importance of context to
behaviour and outcomes. In Mulago hospital, between January 2011 and
October 2012, only one maternal death was recorded on the private ward
compared to 183 on the public ward. The same staff, with the same
training, are responsible for both groups of patients. Figures for the
same time period evidence marked differences in C-section rates for the
private and public ward.
C-section rates on the private ward are around double those on the public
ward.Ongoing engagement with colleagues in the hospitalmade us aware of
the ‘policy’ that all c-sections on the private ward should be undertaken by
obstetric specialists and must be prioritised. These doctors receive ‘top-up’
pro rata payments for such procedures that dwarf monthly salaries. Given this
information the need for EmONC training becomes less obvious.
Intervention: Physical Resource Deﬁcits (Opportunities)
As with Case Study 1 a logical complementary measure responding to
claims on the part of healthcare workers that they lack basic physical
resources to support emergency obstetric interventions was to provide
equipment, infrastructure and consumables – the ‘opportunities’ enabling
them to utilise their skills. And, the problems associated with resource
management in Ugandan public health facilities underline the legitimacy
of this claim. Few, if any, operating theatres in Health Centre IVs are fully
functional and available for use.15
It is with this in mind that the SVP shifted its emphasis mid-project
(and following requests by Ugandan stakeholders) away from large referral
hospitals to address the efﬁcacy of referral systems. This shift was also
informed by evidence on the ground of the failure of CME interventions
in congested hospitals to effect any perceptible systems change and further
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review of the research on maternal delays. These alternative conceptualisa-
tions of the causes of maternal deaths involving more longitudinal and
holistic analyses and multi-disciplinary insights encouraged us to reconsi-
der the data on the stated causes of maternal deaths (Table 5.2). Informed
by research on the ‘three delays’ (Kaye et al. 2011; Pacagnella et al. 2012;
Thaddeus and Maine 1990; Thorsen et al. 2012; Tuncalp et al. 2012) and
our own research on the ground, our focus then became one of reducing
delays in order to avoid preventable problems turning into obstetric
emergencies (or deaths).
One of the sites in which this intervention took place was Kisenyi
Health Centre IV, which refers patients into Mulago Hospital. At the
time of intervention, this purpose-built facility with a full remunerated
stafﬁng complement had not been available to delivering mothers since
opening 7 years previously.
Our revised Theory of Change at this point indicated a focus on restor-
ing functionality to Health Centre IV facilities in order to increase deliv-
eries, thereby reducing congestion in referral facilities and complications
arising from maternal delays.
Intervention
The initial intervention (building on previous experience in two other
facilities) involved an intense 1-week multi-disciplinary problem-solving
exercise. In practice, most of the infrastructure, consumables and staff
were present but small ‘snagging’ problems such as the lack of a sink in
the delivery suite, the lack of drainage to wash ﬂoors and some basic
equipment repair work and a lack of leadership had blocked progress.
Within one week the ﬁrst baby was delivered and, with new local leader-
ship, the facility swung into action.
Outcome: Within 1 year, and following a series of very minor infrastruc-
tural and equipment interventions (costing the charity less than £1000 in
total) the facility achieved a sustained average monthly delivery rate of over
800 (Ackers 2016). Every mother delivered in Kisenyi is one less mother
delivering in Mulago. From that perspective, the impact on congestion and
delays is tangible but not directly measureable/attributable16 as many other
factors will intervene to shape admissions (such as the closing of anothermajor
referral Health Centre at that time and a signiﬁcant outbreak of typhoid).
Despite these successes in building Kisenyi into a fully functioning
midwifery-led unit, the operating theatre remained under-utilised.
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Improving functionality and providing associated training (including
EmONC) supported by volunteer mentoring failed to reduce referrals
for c-sections, which remained high, resulting in preventable deaths
(Ackers 2016). At this stage, we could have signiﬁcantly reduced referrals
if we had allowed SVP volunteers to operate on patients in the absence of
local doctors. We did not allow this breach of the co-presence principle.
Chapter 2 reported on the audit conducted by the then SVP volunteer


























C-section rate labour suite C-section rate private ward (6D/E)
Fig. 5.2 Caesarean section rates on the private and public wards, Mulago
Hospital (Source: McKay and Ackers 2013: 23)
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These included supplies of blood, oxygen and power and the presence of
doctors. Each of these components, whilst apparently ‘simple’, is in practice
a can of worms. The availability of blood is itself a composite problem
reﬂecting power supply (electricity); the adequacy and efﬁcacy of the
blood donation system, elements of corruption and also transportation.
Power is also far more complex than meets the eye; shortages may reﬂect
a failure to pay bills (and disappearance of relevant funds), (political) power
play and funding shortages related to the purchase of fuel for back-up
generators (a common problem in Uganda17) and the inﬂated costs of
solar power in low-resource settings. On occasions any of these elements
may be used and manipulated as excuses for inaction. However, as we have
seen, the most common factor precipitating unnecessary referrals concerns
physician presence.
Rather than go into detail about any of the aforementioned, we have
decided to focus here on a more clinical follow-on intervention; namely, the
institution of elective c-sections. Attempts to institute elective c-section lists
have been repeatedly made by SVP volunteers across all HUB facilities. As
one volunteer explains in her monthly report:
It would help facilities if there was a regular elective day/s for cases that
need a caesarean section to prevent mothers having to await labour and
all its inherent risks when there are likely time delays in access to theatre.
This would possibly reduce transfers, emergency sections and increased
mortality/morbidity.
The institution of elective c-sections would further reduce maternal delays
and the need for emergency/crisis intervention.
Intervention: Implementing Elective (planned) Caesarean Sections
The overwhelming majority of caesarean sections in Uganda are under-
taken as emergencies allowing complications to develop, delays to
lengthen, outcomes to worsen and cost to escalate. A recent audit in
Mulago Hospital (Acen 2015) found that of 200 C-sections undertaken
in September to November 2014, 184 (92 %) were emergency sections.
Introducing an electives c-section list in Health Centre IV Facilities
would build on the success of SVP intervention to ensure more timely
intervention, reducing complications and unnecessary and time-consuming
referrals. On the face of it, this is a very simple intervention requiring
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training/mentoring in the clinical indications for c-section coupled with a
staff rota and booking system.
Intervention: Skills Deﬁcits
Most of the short courses in emergency obstetric care discussed in Chapter 3
include the discussion of indications and guidelines for elective sections.
And this training has been embedded in the SVP through further short-
course skills drills, ongoingmentoring and audit work to support implemen-
tation on the ground.
Intervention: Resource Deﬁcits (Stationary and Records Books)
A desk-book was made available to enable staff to book women for elective
procedures.
Outcome: Sporadic Minimal Improvement
The provision of training, protocol development and mentoring coupled
with the institution of an (unchallenged) booking system failed to improve
c-section rates. This failure is in large part due to the persistent resistance
of local doctors (and at times anaesthetic assistants) to be present and for
local midwives to book patients (anticipating the former and resorting to
the cultural ‘if in doubt refer’ logic). At this point the intervention devel-
ops a level of complexity implying engagement with highly sensitive power
dynamics and generating problems of positionality both within the
Ugandan human resource management system and in the relationships
that ‘outsiders’ have with local staff and managers.
Figure 5.2 indicated that the presence of doctors was a major factor
contributing to over 53 % of referrals. IF we discount referrals made at
night over a quarter of referrals made during normal daytime working
hours cite the lack of medical presence as a key reason (Fig. 5.3).
At this point, the level of complexity involved coupled with the difﬁ-
culties that Health Partnerships and volunteers face as ‘outsiders’ with no
real power to inﬂuence policy makers we attempted to offer moral support
to brave local managers keen to incentivise and enforce accountability in
human resource management systems. The in-charge midwife made con-
siderable efforts to encourage doctors to be present and to expose those
who were not present during their allocated working hours. And the City
authorities (KCCA) increased doctors’ pay (quite considerably) in Health
Centre IV facilities and considered the potential of installing an electronic
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system to record staff presence. In practice, this resulted in short-lived and
minimal behaviour change and signiﬁcant resistance to change among all
doctors.
Somewhat surprisingly, some months later, continued facility bench-
marking identiﬁed a sudden marked increase in elective c-section rates.
Our ﬁrst inclination was to celebrate the apparent success of ongoing





















Fig. 5.3 Reasons for referrals between the hours of 08:00 and 17:00 Kisenyi
Health Centre (Source: Ackers 2016 [CBC: Complete Blood Count])
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interventions and regret our impatience. Our presence on the ground,
however, and localised knowledge raised immediate concerns about this
sudden shift. We were aware that one doctor was making a concerted
effort to improve practice. However, we became suspicious that other
‘entrepreneurial’ practices were emerging as local doctors began to use
the improved premises for private (fee-paying) elective c-sections. SVP
volunteers are unable to ‘prove’ this situation empirically, given the sub-
versive quality of corruption and the risks involved in openly asking ques-
tions – but they expressed concern when ‘surprise’ elective sections were
observed to take priority over emergency cases. This is not the ﬁrst time
that investments made by our programme in improving infrastructure
have stimulated an increase in private cases. Rather than indicating a
problem caused by skills or knowledge deﬁcits, we would conclude that
our interventions have been manipulated through the use of highly entre-
preneurial subversive local knowledge. summarises the processes outlined
in the Case Studies:
The aforementioned case studies do not reﬂect the total (zero-sum)
failure of interventions; capability-enhancing training combined with a
focus on improving the opportunities for skills utilisation are necessary
but insufﬁcient constituents of change. Change can be seen to occur in
terms of individual skills enhancement and, during volunteer co-presence,
some partial skills utilisation and adherence to protocols. But these are key
components in far more complex interventions. Understanding why these
interventions, which typify the overwhelming majority of Health
Partnership-style initiatives internationally, fail to translate into sustainable
systems change is essential if we are to avoid wasting public money and
undermining health systems.
THE KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT MODEL
Why is it, given the lack of tangible evidence that AID, in any of its
guises, works that funding continues to grow exponentially and continue
to fund interventions that either do not work or generate damaging
externality effects? And why, given the clear failure of existing evaluation
metrics to capture the processes responsible for impact failure, is the
solution seen as one of honing metrics? Public and political concern at
the lack of impact of huge volumes of public funding has led to an
increasing obsession with metrics and quantitative outcome measures.
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The UK Department for International Development’s ‘logframe’ meth-
odology has had a major ‘structuring impact’ generating a common
template for the evaluation of international development interventions.
This formulaic approach has led to the emergence of a new (and highly
confusing) conceptual vocabulary requiring projects to report, in a ‘the-
ory of change’ approach on ‘activities’, ‘inputs’, ‘outcomes’ and ‘out-
puts’. The THET, almost entirely reliant on DFID funding, has
necessarily had to import this approach and apply it to all Health
Partnership work. Sadly, this has forced a situation in which the ‘tail
has begun to wag the dog’ as the clamour for funds begins to shape
interventions around the demands of the funding bodies and their eva-
luation metrics rather than perceived needs or a grounded understanding
of what works or does not. And this has a major impact on the use of
evaluation resource; so great is the need to count ‘outcomes’ that there is
little time to try to understand and make sense of failure. And failure is
and has been the dominant outcome of development interventions for
many decades.
The Lancet Commission’s ‘Global Surgery’ report opens with the
statement: ‘Remarkable gains have been made in global health in the
past 25 years’ (Meara, J.G. et al 2015: 569) but provides no evidence to
substantiate this claim. It goes on to present a very holistic and com-
prehensive case for multi-professional interventions informed by the
three delays model and focused on ‘broad-based health-systems solu-
tions’ (p. 570). The concluding section argues that ‘research, monitor-
ing and assessment play a crucial part in the future of global surgery’
together with a ‘commitment to better understand the problems and
solutions’ (p. 616). We would agree wholeheartedly with this prog-
nosis. Having said that, we ﬁrmly believe that attributing this to the
‘complete absence of globally accepted surgical metrics’ entirely misses
the point.
A recent report on International Development Funding by the UK
Government’s Public Accounts Committee found that, despite the tre-
bling of public funding for humanitarian crises, ‘the Department for
International Development did not have a full understanding of where its
money went’ (House of Commons Report 2016). DFID defended its
record arguing that it had a systemwhich enabled it to ‘aggregate the success
of each intervention into a score which it can track month by month across
interventions’ (p. 10). However, it failed to report its portfolio score. What
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we are doing here is attempting to measure the measurable (as information
or ‘data’) rather than the meaningful (as knowledge):
Simplistically conceptualising knowledge as information makes its valuation
and trade measurable but loses most of the originality of the empirical
phenomenon. By contrast when scholars conceptualise knowledge as com-
plex capabilities embodied in people and organisations, it no longer ﬁts into
the concept of an economic good that can be valued, traded, and accumu-
lated, and its exact measurement becomes an impossibility. (Gluckler et al.
2013: 6)
These reports underline the fact that we know so little about the effectiveness
of AID and that the solution to this problem is seen to lie in the production
of ever-more quantitative metrics. No attempts are made to question the
underlying epistemological biases of this logic or, put more simply, the fact
that metrics have never worked and never will capture the ‘problems and
solutions’ facing health systems in LMICs (or indeed the UK).
Fundamentally, we are suffering from a form of myopia generated by
the domination of medical science perspectives or knowledge paradigms
which determine the diagnoses, the interventions and epistemological
approaches to evaluation. The quest for statistical outcomes (ideally
gained through the gold standard of randomised controlled trials) under-
pinned by the narrowing blinkers of systematic review restricts our ability
to understand social processes. There is also a tendency within this para-
digm to pathologise or patronise individuals whilst failing to understand
the impact of structural constraints. Despite growing recognition of the
importance of context, this is often in the form of lip service at best
acknowledging it as a cluster of variables that we don’t understand (as
external ‘noise’) or, at worst, rather than understanding and capturing its
iterative quality, trying to insulate our interventions from it through vain
or inappropriate attempts to control it. Trying to cleanse data through
what feminist researchers have called a ‘sanitisation process’ (Harding
1987, 1991) will not generate cleaner facts. It will take us further away
from the truth as the cleansing process strips data of its real value: of
understanding the social processes that shape phenomenon. It may be that
what we are swilling away in the efﬂuent is that which is of greatest value.
This narrow conceptualisation of knowledge not only affects the approach
to evaluation, but it also reproduces a partial understanding of knowledge
mobilisation as an activity. The emphasis on explicit clinical skills and neglect
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of tacit knowledge leads to the identiﬁcation of a ‘knowledge deﬁcit’
encouraging uni-directional ﬂows (from the host to the LMIC or from
doctors to midwives). We are not adding skills to context (as the COM-B
model implies): context lies at the heart of complex ﬂuid and, oftentimes
confounding knowledge combinations. Or, asMcCormack puts it: ‘nothing
exists and can be understood in isolation from its context’ (2015: 3009).
On the basis of our research and learning, we would argue that far from
a skills deﬁcit we are in a situation of knowledge saturation; clinical skills/
information are not the primary problem and using clinical ‘experts’ as
conduits for yet more skills-forcing interventions is neither efﬁcient nor
effective. To the contrary, it is both arrogant and wasteful. This arrogance
does not derive solely (although this certainly does contribute) to the
imposition of ‘expert information’ from the global North: from well-
meaning but narrow thinking foreign clinical experts and ‘donors’. It is
the consequence of a failure to see the bigger picture – of narrowing
disciplinary knowledge paradigms. Although the lack of patient manage-
ment is recognised as an issue by all UK clinicians working in Uganda: it
was a visiting Ugandan obstetrician who proposed the initiative to intro-
duce the African Maternal Early Warning Score (AMEWS) into Mulago
Hospital. Enthralled by its apparent success in the UK (visiting foreigners
are often not exposed to or fail to see the fundamental weaknesses of UK
systems) she quite understandably attempted a ‘policy transfer’ approach:
she ‘saw’ a clinical solution to a clinical problem and tried to transfer it.
And as a project we sought to support her in this without comprehending
the localised knowledge that would ultimately render it unsuccessful.
Knowledge can be both enabling and disabling; it is not only a deﬁcit of
skills/knowledge that hampers progress; narrow siloed knowledge
(focused on harvesting facts) can limit our ability to see the social world
and the truth that lies behind interventions. Resistance to change may be
fuelled by knowledge and often quite entrepreneurial tacit localised
knowledge. From an individual perspective – how to make ends meet
and sustain your family – or, from a systems perspective – how to organise
and funnel the rewards from systemic forms of corruption – requires a level
of localised tacit knowledge and rational/entrepreneurial decision making
that foreign volunteers may fail to ‘see’.
The overall conclusion of this book, based on intense multi-method
action-oriented research over a period of 8 years, is that international
development initiatives in the form of Health Partnerships and through
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the mechanism of professional voluntarism (staff exchanges) are failing to
bring about signiﬁcant sustainable systems change in the Ugandan public
health sector. Having said that, we believe that Health Partnership activity
has the potential to mitigate the forms of systems damage associated with
AID. More importantly, we believe it has the capacity to form the basis of
evidence-based incremental systems change. Achieving this will require a
much more structured approach to professional volunteer deployment
based on principles of negotiated conditionality. Whilst we emphasise
the importance of understanding the beneﬁts and humility of increment-
alism in policy change, from an epistemological perspective we need a
paradigm shift.
If we reﬂect on the three scenarios presented in Chapter 1, we can
conclude that the risks associated with Scenario 3 (negative impact
through collateral damage) remain very high and most AID activity
falls into this category. In terms of long-term sustainability, most of
what we have achieved through the SVP would fall under Scenario 2
(neutral long-term impact but with minimal externality effects). More
optimistically, and informed by the iterative learning we have experi-
enced ourselves as researchers and project managers, we believe that
Scenario 1 is achievable (partial improvement with minimal collateral
damage).
The book opened and is peppered with ﬁrmly expressed concerns about
the externality effects of AID focused on gap ﬁlling and service delivery.
We have talked a lot about collateral damage, the unintended conse-
quences of well-intentioned interventions and the critical importance of
co-presence. When interventions, such as the SVP and the Health
Partnership Scheme more generally, are based on sound conditionality
principles, externality effects may be positive. Certainly the co-presence
principle supports the active clinical engagement of professional volun-
teers. In this process, the collateral beneﬁts of systems focused interven-
tion are enormous. We have no doubt and are reminded on a daily basis of
the impacts of our work and of professional volunteers in particular on
patient services and individual patients. SVP volunteers are saving the lives
of mothers and babies in Uganda on a daily basis. Finally, the key bene-
ﬁciaries of the SVP model are those patients who rely on public welfare to
meet their healthcare needs, both in the immediate term (through the
daily hands-on engagement of volunteers) and through longer-term sys-
tems change.
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The following section outlines some key elements of structure and
conditionality that we have identiﬁed through our action-research jour-
ney. These concerns and the recommendations that accompany them may
not be directly applicable or transportable to other LMIC or disciplinary
contexts but when carefully contextualised and translated they could
inform policy making and volunteer deployment.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Corruption
Health Partnership interventions, as with all AID, generate vast opportu-
nities for corruption. Opportunities for corruption are identiﬁed and
exploited in every interaction we engage in from the use of disposable
gloves to the donation of equipment. This is a highly entrepreneurial and
innovative process which is very hard for ‘outsiders’ to see or to challenge.
In this context, professional volunteers are often viewed as ‘spies’ and as
such are open to forms of harassment. More commonly, they are unable to
function effectively as clinicians and knowledge intermediaries.
Recommendation 1: Whistle Blowing
Health Partnerships and Volunteer Deployment Agencies need to work
closely with their Ugandan partners on the ground and provide support
mechanisms for volunteers to encourage them to recognise and report
corruption. Health Partnerships are often loath to acknowledge or take
action on corruption for fear of damaging relationships. This, in itself,
damages relationships.
2. Labour Substitution
Our research indicates a signiﬁcant potential for system damage when
interventions are framed inappropriately to the context and when the
context is itself misunderstood. Labour substitution is a huge risk. It
undermines systems, distorts local labour markets and accentuates exist-
ing human resource management problems actively encouraging absen-
teeism and moonlighting (dual working). It is also profoundly arrogant.
This ‘style’ of volunteering stems from traditional donor–recipient mod-
els and is particularly associated with missionary-style volunteering. The
focus on ‘helping’ individual patients and creating parallel institutions
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for this purpose (mission hospitals etc.), whilst perfectly understand-
able, in the wider scheme of things undermines universal public health
systems.
Recommendation 2.1: Advocacy in Human Resource Management
The efﬁcacy of professional voluntarism will not improve unless key
stakeholders in LMICs introduce and enforce accountability in human
resource management systems. Measures must be put in place to ensure
the timely payment of salaries and to discipline and/or dismiss staff
members who fail to comply and present themselves for work. Unless
local staff are present in the workplace, the opportunities for knowledge
mobilisation and systems change are minimal. Speciﬁc attention needs to
be paid to staff in leadership and senior positions, especially doctors. If
leaders fail to present themselves for work in a timely manner, the lack of
effective role modelling reinforces a culture of bad practice. Leadership is
seriously lacking in most Ugandan health facilities. We do not believe
this represents a need for training, however, but for improved
accountability.
Recommendation 2.2: Co-Presence
All efforts should be taken to respect and embed the principle of co-presence
when deploying professional volunteers. This should be interpreted as a key
component of conditionality and where co-presence is not possible volun-
teers should be required to withdraw from that context. The only exception
to this should be in carefully managed and documented emergency situa-
tions. The failure to respect co-presence by volunteer deploying organisa-
tions and individual volunteers undermines the position of those who are
respecting the principle and generates resentment. Managing and operatio-
nalising co-presence requires the development of highly structured pro-
grammes for volunteer deployment with clear role descriptions and
reporting mechanisms. ‘Lone Ranger’ and Missionary-style volunteering
undermines these processes.
The enforcement of co-presence as a key dimension of account-
ability in human resource management systems requires high-level
action at ministerial level and involving consortiums of international
NGOs working in collaboration. This is the single most critical ele-
ment of conditionality.
5 ITERATIVE LEARNING: ‘KNOWLEDGE FOR CHANGE’? 141
3. Equality and Ethical Standards in Volunteer Deployment
The THET has played a major role in supporting (and requiring) more
structured, risk-assessed and ethical approaches to volunteer deployment.
We believe that this has gone a long way to ensuring that the recruitment
and deployment of professional volunteers complies with UK equality law
and policy. However, we have witnessed behaviour on the part of UK-
registered Charities operating in Uganda, particularly those involved in
Mission Hospitals (affecting both Ugandan health workers and UK volun-
teers) which would seriously breach all equality rules in the UK. This
includes overt discrimination on grounds of sexuality, gender, race, reli-
gious beliefs and breaches of the principles of the Working Time Directive
and work–life balance.
Recommendation 3: Equality and Charitable Status
We have noted (earlier) our concern at the role that faith-based NGOs
(charities) play in running parallel organisations independent of the
Ugandan public health sector. As a general rule, we believe this process
undermines the public system and creates opportunities to extend dama-
ging forms of missionary-style colonialism. These exist in a ‘bubble’ with
apparent immunity from both Ugandan and UK law and policy and
attract religious fanatics. All UK charities operating in LMICs should
be required to abide by both Ugandan and UK Employment, Charity
and Equality Laws. Failure to comply should result in loss of charitable
status.
4. The Commodiﬁcation of Training
It is inappropriate and wasteful to pay people (per diems) to receive
training. The payments attached to training have distorted the whole
meaning of training and created a situation where people are training for
the wrong reasons and the wrong people are consuming the opportunities
on offer. The failure of LMICs and development organisations to develop
a common policy on this generates tensions and a competitive environ-
ment, which further detracts from knowledge mobilisation objectives.
AID organisations have commodiﬁed training, creating new opportunities
for corruption and serial absenteeism especially among senior staff and
‘leaders’.
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Recommendation 4: Per Diems
The practice of providing per diems for training should be immediately
stopped. We urge the Ugandan Ministry of Health and District Health
Ofﬁces to create protocols to regulate these practices so that training
interventions reach the people they are designed for and perverse incen-
tives are extinguished. Providing essential assistance with transport and
refreshments is less of a problem. Organising training events as close as
possible to health workers’ work place and, where possible, in the work-
place reduces these costs (and risks) whilst also reducing the amount of
time health workers are away from the wards.
5. Internal Brain Drain
Often overlooked, internal brain drain has a far greater impact on the human
resource ‘crisis’ in LMICs than external brain drain (emigration). And
development interventions create signiﬁcant opportunities for this through
the employment of staff in project management and other roles. This is a
complex issue. What is clear from our research is that the clamour for
‘project employment’ is having a hugely distorting effect on national labour
markets and career development strategies. The effect of this is to encourage
an emphasis on non-clinical postgraduate qualiﬁcations (Masters in Business
Administration or Public Health for example) as part of a planned exit from
clinical work. This is often seen as the alternative to dual working (internal
brain drain into the private sector whilst in full-time public employment),
which blocks positions for early career health workers.
Recommendation 5: Remunerating Staff in LMICs
There is no simple solution to this complex ethical problem. We are,
quite rightly, encouraged by funding bodies to employ local staff where
possible and build capacity in leadership and management. However,
we believe that local staff should receive a level of remuneration
broadly parallel to what they would (or should) receive in their public
roles. We have tried to identify the level of pay that delivers a ‘living
wage’ as opposed to the (below) subsistence-level pay that health
workers are receiving in Uganda. Ultimately the MOH needs to
increase health worker pay quite signiﬁcantly for all cadres and impose
a level of accountability to ensure that those who are paid are present
and work effectively.
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We would propose that a doubling of health worker salaries could be
achieved at no cost and with marked efﬁciencies by dismissing all those
staff who fail to report for work. Once this level is achieved and staff
members are paid on time, foreign organisations should remunerate at
national rates. From a system perspective, it is irresponsible and unethical
to remunerate health workers in Uganda at rates common in the UK or
the USA.
6. Continuing Professional Development (or Continuing
Medical Education)
Health Partnership interventions have focused on the provision of short
courses aimed at health workers. Uganda lacks an active CPD programme
in most professional areas and there is little evidence of active Professional
Development Review Systems. In some areas such as bio-medical engi-
neering they are entirely absent. This leaves a vacuum for foreign organi-
sations. In isolation and without follow-up, one-off short courses do little
to change professional behaviour; ongoing mentoring on the job increases
the opportunities for health workers to gain conﬁdence and skills; this is a
necessary but insufﬁcient condition for individual behaviour change.
Recommendation 6.1: Professional Development Review
CPD/CME training needs to be embedded within a comprehensive PDR
process for health workers so that needs are identiﬁed by line managers
and training is organised to meet those needs.
Recommendation 6.2: Post-Training Mentoring Is Critical
to Knowledge Mobilisation
One-off formal CMEs are effective in transmitting information. Operational
isation and application of that learning needs support on the job to build
conﬁdence and hone skills. Professional volunteers along with their peers
have a potentially valuable role to play in this process. Notwithstanding the
pressure on health workers, Uganda does have many experienced clinicians.
It is important that these staff members are required to support volunteers
in the training and mentoring process as part of their professional role (and
not on a top-up fee basis). At the present time, there is very little evidence of
supervision and mentoring on the part of experienced Ugandan clinicians
and we should take care not to substitute or commodify these roles. Careful
thought should be given to the value of taking staff away from their clinical
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duties for one-off training if there are no mechanisms in place to support
post-course co-working and mentoring.
7. Donations
Donations of equipment, consumables or cash distort relationships and
generate misunderstandings, which pose problems for subsequent inter-
ventions and volunteer activities. Professional volunteers are often seen
ﬁrst and foremost as ‘donors’ or, more crudely but accurately, ‘cash cows’.
The SVP and its sister bio-medical engineering project have drawn atten-
tion to the serious problems associated with donated equipment, much of
which lies unused or unusable creating problems for storage and infection
control. It also means that managers often lack awareness of what equip-
ment there is in their facilities. On a more mundane level, it is important to
explain to prospective volunteers the importance of discussing donations
and requests for cash support, etc., with the project managers.
Recommendation 7: Donations Policies
All organisations, both in the sending country and in the LMIC, should
adopt a transparent and joined-up donations policy. However kind and
generous the intentions, the act of donation can pollute relations and
generate problems. Care should be taken whenever providing infrastruc-
tural support to public facilities. The provision of consumables and equip-
ment generates dependency, encourages opportunities for corruption and
is entirely unsustainable. Where support is provided, the objective should
be to provide the very minimum of support to leverage local systems rather
than substituting for them. We consider this to be an example of ‘snag-
ging’ where a whole facility can be out of action because there is no sink,
for example, but local staff exist to install the sink. When providing
support the SVP and our sister bio-medical engineering project developed
a ﬁrm policy on donations.18
8. Evaluation: Efﬁcacy and Meaning
We have described the SVP project as a journey. This has been mainly a
research journey. We embarked upon it with an extensive background in
multi-methods, comparative, high-impact social research. Throughout
this journey we have experienced a creative tension with the evaluation
arm of the funding body and with other organisations and stakeholders in
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the global health ﬁeld. This discomfort has generated active learning for us
as researchers unfamiliar with the foundations of medical research, its
dominance across health sciences and the quite similar metrics paradigm
framing international development. Our concerns about the epistemolo-
gical bias of these approaches and their inability to capture social context
and process are well rehearsed in the book. But we have another concern
about the efﬁcacy of evaluation. The Health Partnership Scheme in
common with so many other funders of global health has begun to
conceptualise every actor in a funded project as a researcher. On one
level we commend that and it resonates with our ethical commitment to
co-researching. The problem is that researching such complex interven-
tions requires a very high degree of research expertise and is hugely time-
consuming. Partners in HP projects do not have the time or necessarily the
expertise to undertake extensive literature reviews or policy analysis work;
neither do they possess the skills to develop research plans and operatio-
nalise mixed-methods studies. And, they may well not have the experi-
ence, time or desire to engage in complex data analysis and writing up.
Whilst all actors can become engaged in action-research projects and we
have certainly viewed our Ugandan colleagues and professional volunteers
as co-researchers, ﬁnally a considerable research expertise is required to
design, manage and make sense of the data.
On that basis we would question the pressure put on all projects to
conduct in-depth, expensive and time-consuming evaluation. Certainly
attempts to aggregate core indicators across the diversity of projects will
achieve nothing apart from churning out meaningless and potentially
misleading statistics.
Recommendation 8: Evaluation Policy
We would recommend that valuable resource expended on evaluation be
used more wisely to conduct expert research on a sample of interventions
managed by researchers with proven expertise. Many private consultancy
organisations lack academic research training and experience and consti-
tute an expensive and poor-quality ‘offer’. The British Academy Report on
the role of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Public Policy Making
(Wilson 2008) expressed concern at the very high proportion of UK
government department’s research budgets that were being ‘allocated to
short-term projects to meet current political and administrative demands’
arguing that the government was failing to leverage the academic research
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base. Identifying the demands of complex inter-departmental collabora-
tions straddling the boundaries of departments, it argues that ‘many
challenges require a more sophisticated understanding of human beha-
viour’ (Executive Summary p. 1). The report concurs with our recom-
mendation that research funding should be focused more into support
longitudinal peer-reviewed knowledge development.
KNOWLEDGE FOR CHANGE?
A common response when we present our research ﬁndings is to ask us why
we carry on with the work when the outcomes are so bleak and depressing.
We do not ﬁnd the work depressing. Indeed, to the contrary, it has been
quite liberating. We cannot begin to develop interventions that have the
potential to bring about systems change unless we have the knowledge base
to understand the context and the processes involved. Trying to understand
another country and co-design complex interventions takes time; it also
challenges our skills as researchers and activists. This book has been written
at a particular juncture in this learning process. We will carry on learning but
we feel that we have achieved a level of understanding (and knowledge base)
now that can and should be shared with others to reframe interventions.
We have always enjoyed the company of our Ugandan colleagues. We
do not regard ourselves as ‘donors’ or them as ‘recipients’: rather we
regard each other as fellow professionals. And we would like to move
away from the language of helping or volunteering to speak more colle-
gially about international faculty. We know from previous research and
common experience that international exposure tends to reinforce rather
than challenge stereotypes. Researchers and volunteers new to the ﬁeld
will unwittingly been drawn into absorbing and echoing those stereotypes:
of Ugandan health workers as poorly trained and under-skilled, lazy,
demotivated, lacking respect for fellow humans and corrupt. And the
landscape we ‘see’ may reinforce this perception. Some of the research
we have encountered along the way, notably from behavioural science
perspectives, has the unintentional tendency to add intellectual credibility
to these stereotypes often essentialising human behaviour. The work of
evolutionary economics has given us fresh insight and lifted us from the
traps of individualism, enabling us to forge genuine human relationships
with our Ugandan colleagues as fellow human beings. Finally, there is
more that we share than that which distinguishes us: context is indeed
everything.
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NOTES
1. Which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is ‘a thing which is
hoped for but is illusory or impossible to achieve’.
2. The term ‘theory’ when used in the context of a ‘theory of change’ either
in health sciences research or, quite commonly, in international develop-
ment evaluation has a much narrower and more speciﬁc meaning than
‘theory’ in social science. It may be easier to view it as a form of working
hypothesis.
3. According to Wikipedia: ‘Triage is the process of determining the priority of
patients’ treatments based on the severity of their condition. This rations
patient treatment efﬁciently when resources are insufﬁcient for all to be
treated immediately’.
4. Funded by THET as part of the UgandanMaternal and New bornHUB grant.
5. Various adaptations of UK Maternal Early Warning Scoring systems have
been introduced throughout the HUB. In practice, it has proved impossible
to encourage all HPs to adopt the same system. The MEWS is a form of
patient management system designed to enable staff to identify the sick
patient and respond accordingly.
6. It is important to point out that our subsequent decision, as part of the
THET-funded bio-medical engineering project we are running in parallel to
the SVP has engaged with the ‘opportunities’ dilemma by providing the
technicians that we are training across the HUB with a toolkit. WE also
provided high-quality tool boxes for the technicians to store their tools in.
This has been a resounding success with very little evidence of losses or
thefts over 2 years after the intervention. In this example, the technicians
have been working as part of a close team or Community of Practice with
close attention to personal ownership and accountability.
7. Land lines are rare and staff are usually expected to use their own air time for
such calls.
8. We are using the example of EmONC here but the same conclusions apply
to all similar forms of CME-style training that volunteers have been involved
in including neonatal resuscitation courses, which rarely if ever translate into
effective practice and safer anaesthesia programmes.
9. Volunteer motivations are discussed in detail in Chatwin et al. (2016).
10. Language is also a problem; the term ‘abortion’ is used in Uganda to refer to
miscarriages. Many of these are in fact (illegal) abortions.
11. https://www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-services/guidelines/?p=5.
12. In the sense that training in critical care was seen as the primary objective.
13. For details see www.knowlege4change.org.uk.
14. See http://www.who.int/patientsafety/implementation/apps/en/.
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15. The Health Sector Strategic Plan (2010/2011–2014/2015) includes a target
of ‘increasing the functionality of the HC IVs from 5 % to 50 %’ (p. 48).
16. There was a drop in admissions to Mulago for the ﬁrst time since 2000 but
we cannot claim attribution.
17. Wherever fuel is involved there are high risks of corruption and a lack of
‘petty cash’.
18. The K4C Induction Pack advises students and volunteers about donations:
www.knowledg4change.org.uk, p. 24.
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